Comparative Civilizations Review
Volume 22
Number 22 Fall 1990

Article 4

10-1-1990

The Care of the Self: Two Brief Essays, 2. From Foucault to Leites
Paolo Fabri
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris and Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, Palermo

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr

Recommended Citation
Fabri, Paolo (1990) "The Care of the Self: Two Brief Essays, 2. From Foucault to Leites," Comparative
Civilizations Review: Vol. 22 : No. 22 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol22/iss22/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Comparative Civilizations Review by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For
more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Fabri: The Care of the Self: Two Brief Essays, 2. From Foucault to Leite

FROM FOUCAULT TO LEITES

P A O L O FABBRI

As if by an effect of perspective, much of what stands out in
E d m u n d Leites' p a p e r on Seneca lies in its background: the third
volume of Michel Foucault's History of Sexuality, The Care of Self It
seems that in o r d e r to improve what is unspoken in Leites' short
paper, we should take into consideration some points about
Foucault that Leites has already b r o u g h t out in his recent book,
The Puritan Conscience and Modern Sexuality.
Foucault's book represents a definitive contribution to the
knowledge of and to the scepsis of the golden age of self-culture,
the second and third centuries of late antiquity. Let us reconsider
some of the problems it brings to light. In The Care of Self,
Foucault focuses on the regimes of austerity that characterised
the Hellenistic discursive f o r m a t i o n s of Seneca, Epictetus,
Plutarch, X e n o p h o n , and Artemidorus. Even though they were
part of that long s u m m e r of Hellenism, so disapproved of by
Christianity f o r its dissolute promiscuity, they were, in fact, severe
towards pleasure (and its signs), towards that aphrodisia that we
have never considered austere. Foucault (like Veyne and Hadot)
does not consider their texts as a code of prohibitions but rather as
a set of maxims, of rules for living, of various forms of savoir-vivre
of lifestyles—all the various means and effects of a very intense
relationship with oneself. T h e s e moral programs were techniques
of subjectification that the cultivated m a n of the time used to
question himself, not as a m e m b e r of society but as a universally
rational being. Foucault explored meticulously the forms that
make the subject a field of action and passion as well as an agent of
knowledge. Even if the art of making precepts about austerity and
moderation 'migrated' f r o m the language of motives in the classical tradition, it reappears in the Hellenistic texts in a new and
fresh light. These manners and procedures have become a fine
art of living that f o r m e d , if not an ethics, then an etiquette
understood as a form of self-culture.
Amongst the prolific writings of Seneca, we find in the theory-
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fiction of the 'Sicilian' letters to Lucilius, an entire battery of
instructions for use, indeed a whole posology about the epimeleia,
self-study. If not quite an anachoresis then it represents at least a
clinic of the soul with a full agenda of training courses in moderation and examinations of conscience. These had the aim of modifying moral and physical dispositions and moulding the passions
of the body and the mind (the pathos) in o r d e r to activate pleasure
without desire or worry. T h e letters of Seneca propose a type of
'temperance league' pursuing moderation, capable of living ethically and esthetically in the name of the universal principles of
h u m a n nature.
Abstinence, continence a n d o t h e r ascetic practices have
theoretical implications. T h e y introduce a diacritics of representation and test the value of personal signs (memory) and
collective signs (the display of social differences) in o r d e r to
r e t u r n to the self and to go beyond it. Foucault considers that this
process of self-transformation marks the shift f r o m the GraecoRoman juridical tradition of mastery to a condition of reflexive
enjoyment; f r o m a voluptas inspired by a sense of lack to a
gaudium, a lasting and accomplished capacity for self-enjoyment.
It is not, as is o f t e n these days suggested, a question of a
regression to individualism. Rather, it seems that the cheerfulness
of the moral subject is affirmed in the intimacy of the couple (that
new idea that there was both a master and a mistress of a house. P. Veyne)
that is to say in a renewed role for relationships of emotional
reciprocity and dependence. T h e new managerial aristocracy of
the Roman Empire gave u p the ethics and esthetics of a life based
on status in o r d e r to master the signs of both superiority and
interiorisation. It was n o t j u s t a simple opposition between apathy
and commitment, but a problematisation of a moral actor's political activity in terms of his personal destiny.
Both physical and emotional self-control and the regulation of
feelings and biological habits led towards a logos (and not a law),
towards an identical rationality for the good government of self
and of others. Seneca seems to have put this moral critique of the
political economy of the sign into practice without any reservation. Its ideal-type is Marcus Aurelius, in his refusal of the Caesarian model, his detachment f r o m ostensible signs of power and
above all because of his meticulous regulation (guided by the
principles of consistency and moderation) of the decision-making
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and evaluation process. T h e stoic E m p e r o r had to gain control of
his own excesses and oscillations of mood as well as those of public
destiny.
Leites has reexamined Foucault critically in his book by taking
u p the notion of constancy that set the rhythm of both action and
passion for the English Puritans. As distinct f r o m the vernacular
of Weberians, Leites considers these moral and ceremonial practices of subjectification as community goals. In a period of crisis of
confidence in the great foundation myths (whether ecclesiastical
or monarchical) the Puritans smoothed over their emotional ups
and downs and the irregularities of the curve of their actions, in
o r d e r to become capable of predicting their own conduct and
thus offering a reciprocal contract of reliability. But how can the
intrinsic variety of emotions a n d effects of sense be regulated
without losing their singularity? How can repeated and continual
e n d u r a n c e be m a d e compatible with the s u d d e n and intense
variations of regimes of subjectivity? Is it not obvious that we are
alive, if and only if, r a t h e r frequently we do not accomplish what
we have planned and also that o u r interior fluctuations are the
only real indicators of the space within us? T h e r e is much which
can wither those flowers we place in o u r button-holes, the banal
parts of morality.
In other words, what tactics (both in sexual conduct and in the
administration of the respublica) can a community employ to resolve the problems created by the Puritan project of popularising
the process of subject formation that Seneca had proposed f o r
only a small elite? Leites finds a response in the very style of
Seneca, a calm flowing surface that the various moods d a r t in and
out of; the instances of ennunciation breaking-up the overused
language of topoi. This is not some literary sleight of hand. Leites'
work is r a t h e r an example of the rigorous practice of the
Foucauldian method, treating discursive formations u n d e r the
maxims of continuous variation (i.e. matrices of transformation),
and of tactical polyvalency (i.e. totality or parts can be used for
d i f f e r e n t strategies). It exposes the textual tension of various
passages of Seneca's writing, which he used to discipline himself,
proto-modern philosopher that he was, but also to accept himself
for what he was, felt and did.
These analyses extend a point which Foucault only gestured
towards in The Archaeology of Knowledge. T h e Foucault of latter
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years no longer maintained his earlier notion of epistemological
discontinuity (cuts, openings, fissures) in the style of Bachelard or
Canghuilhem. Coming into contact with a new object of study, in
the History of Sexuality, his attention moves towards the gradual
and continuous rather than the discontinuous, emphasising intensifications and stresses, rather than ruptures. This change did
not represent a renunciation of the structural method which is
not in fact oriented towards change but committed to study discourses' matrices of transformation as well as their forms. 'Fracture' is precisely the term given to describe a transformation of a
regime of discursive formations. 'Fractures' do not stand on their
own but rather represent a limit, a border glimpsed and gestured
towards f r o m a distance. T h e edge of discontinuity has to be
understood as a space full of viscousity and decalages. If we accept
this 'dispersed discontinuity' then the task remains to break it u p
into more irreducible differences. Continuity and discontinuity
hence can be put together so as to, in the words of Foucault
multiply the differences, cross the lines of communication and make the
transitions more difficult. It is precisely in this sense then that the
tension that Leites points out in Seneca should be understood, not
as referring to the creativity of the a u t h o r but to the activities of
multiplying, dispersing, stressing and intensifying.
Death snipped the thread of Michel Foucault's research but it
only prevented him f r o m embroidering those finishing touches
to it which, after all, are the first to wear out. T h e solidity of his
theoretical edifice would only be negated by mere admiration.
Rather we can measure its significance by the capacity of its
epistemological web to entangle ever more texts and metaphors.
T h e posthumous light of The Care of Self could better be used to
make other objects shine rather than simply as a means of assembling false memories. Leites' book is not only an invitation but
also an indication of how to proceed. "No sensible man would
insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it
is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble
one—and a man should repeat it to himself as if it were an
incantation." (Plato, Phaedo, 114d)
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris and
Facolta di Lettere e Filosofia, Palermo
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